Cold War Illusions: America, Europe, and Soviet Power, 1969-1989

Concentrating on the years after 1970-the period of detente and the ``Second Cold War'' that followed it-Allin argues that Moscow's global power was vastly exaggerated by Washington policymakers, in large part because the vulnerability of our European allies to Soviet intimidation was distorted. According to Allin, Soviet strength was weakest when the West thought it at its height. His balanced study pays equal attention to the domestic decline in the Soviet Union during the 1970s and to Moscow's flawed foreign policy, showing that Marxist theory's ``internal contradictions'' did indeed bring about a systematic, global collapse-of communism, not capitalism. He refutes the notion that President Reagan's get-tough policy and increased defense spending gave the decisive push that toppled the Soviet system; the Cold War was won, he says, before Reagan entered the White House. Students of foreign policy will find especially interesting the author's concluding argument that ``America's greatest interest in Europe has always been a moral one.'' Allin is deputy director of the Aspin Institute in Berlin. (Apr.)