Diamond, a defense analyst and former reporter for USA Today
, presents a perceptive account of the reasons behind a double-barreled intelligence fiasco: 9/11 and the invasion of Iraq. In the case of 9/11, Diamond claims that the CIA failed to determine the “target, timing, and perpetrators” of an attack it knew was coming. With Iraq, he says, the CIA perceived a threat that did not exist: weapons of mass destruction. The failures were linked, Diamond says. The implosion of the Soviet Union ended the threat the CIA was designed to meet, leaving the agency at loose ends in an unstructured global environment. Revelations of intelligence failures bred a “culture of failure,” by which Diamond means a crisis of confidence in the CIA's abilities. That generated internal friction and factionalism, with blind spots and biases shaping judgments. One result was failure to assemble a coherent image of developing security threats. Another was overcompensating for 9/11 by reasoning that with Iraq, safe was better than sorry. Diamond's evaluation of the CIA's crisis of confidence adds insight to debates about intelligence failures. 10 illus. (Sept)
