Closing with the Enemy: How GIS Fought the War in Europe, 1944-1945

Countering the widely held belief that U.S. forces in Europe-often viewed as inferior to their German counterparts-prevailed in WWII because of a preponderance of material resources, Doubler's study reveals that Gen. Dwight Eisenhower's divisions had to overcome substantial shortages of personnel and material. Their success, he demonstrates, was due largely to their coordinated use of infantry, tanks, artillery, air power and military engineers. Tracing their advance from Normandy into Germany, Doubler's clear account shows how the Army's tactics validated then-current doctrines while at the same time the troops learned how to apply new principles of combined-arms warfare. His main argument-that U.S. Army forces in Europe were more effective than is generally recognized-is convincing. One chapter analyzes the publications of notable military writers Russell Weigley, Martin Van Creveld and S.L.A. Marshall, whose views differ from his. Doubler has taught at West Point and is currently stationed at Army headquarters in Washington, D.C. Illustrations. (Dec.)