Hanhimäki is one of the most persuasive of the many detractors of Henry Kissinger, President Nixon's national security adviser and eventually secretary of state. Kissinger's penchant for covert action to undermine governments the administration saw as enemies, such as Chile and Angola, and his employment of secret back channels rather than open diplomacy, were, the author contends, hallmarks of his foreign policy. Hanhimäki, an editor of the journal Cold War History,
calls Kissinger's "unapologetic realpolitik" approach to the Soviet Union, China and North Vietnam "morally questionable," though he asserts that Kissinger was not a war criminal. He was, rather, "disappointing" in his short-sightedness, never anticipating the long-term consequences of deals with adversaries, acquiescing, for example, in Indonesia's genocidal takeover of East Timor to placate an anticommunist regime. Although Kissinger had insisted, "The U.S. will not negotiate a surrender of South Vietnam," in effect he did precisely that, winning a shared Nobel Peace Prize. The subsequent bloodbath led to a rare concession from a man who, according to Hanhimäki, valued his credibility above all: ruefully, he offered to return the Peace Prize, but was told he had to keep it ("Rules were rules"). Hanhimäki offers a striking indictment, so it is unfortunate that the many repetitions make his book sometimes tedious and frustrating to read. (Sept.)
