Wars of Eduard Shevardnadze

Relying mainly on newspaper accounts and interviews, Ekedahl and Goodman argue that former Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze deserves a place in history as a catalyst for bringing an end to the Soviet Union: ""Considered the moral force for `new thinking,' he was the new point man in the struggle to undermine the forces of inertia at home and end Moscow's isolation abroad."" The authors, the chief of public communications on the public affairs staff of the CIA and a professor of international security studies at the National War College, respectively, begin with a sketchy, unconvincing account of his background (Shevardnadze ""was a Georgian, given to innovative thinking and bold actions"") and his rise to power as an opportunist who had a reputation for paying more than the necessary homage to his superiors. They then take the reader thematically through the final years of the U.S.S.R.: here they raise a number of important issues, for example, that Gorbachev's economic reforms at home required Shevardnadze to pursue stability and predictability abroad; or that U.S. officials slowed the pace of diplomatic change because they were unwilling to believe that Soviet changes were for real. In the authors' view, Shevardnadze, long the head of the Georgian Communist Party before being appointed Foreign Minister, is a pragmatist at his core; this characterization appears more convincing in light of his conciliatory actions vis-a-vis Russia since he assumed the Georgian presidency in 1992. A workmanlike study, this book is a tentative first step toward addressing what made some of the highest officials in the Communist Party decide to turn long-standing Soviet policies upside down. (Apr.)