Zero-Sum Victory: What We’re Getting Wrong about War

Retired Army colonel Kolenda (editor, Leadership: The Warrior’s Art) examines in this persuasive if wonky study why America’s post-9/11 military interventions have not gone as planned. He contends that the U.S. government has been unable to devise a durable plan for securing peace and stability after initial battlefield victories, and criticizes the inflexibility of U.S. military leaders who remained wedded for years to the idea of keeping the Afghan army small and highly professionalized, rather than building a large force through conscription or voluntary service. According to Kolenda, this inflexibility made Afghanistan’s military too small to serve the country’s internal security needs, and helped transform it into a clique rather than a representative institution. Furthermore, once America’s political leaders decide to withdraw from a conflict, Kolenda alleges, opposition forces have little reason to negotiate with the U.S. government and its allies. The Taliban, for example, used talks with the Obama administration to “gain concessions that improved their legitimacy while coaxing the United States to complete the withdrawal of its forces.” Though the academic prose can be slow going, Kolenda is a lucid explainer of foreign and domestic affairs and “America’s bureaucratic way of war.” This is an insightful call for rethinking U.S. military strategy. (Dec.)