T
here are weapons of mass destruction after all, merely in a different country with a ruler wackier than Saddam Hussein. Pritchard, a former envoy to North Korea, writes that a sensible diplomatic approach to dictator Kim Jong-Il would have eliminated his nuclear program, then carefully recounts 15 years of diplomatic maneuvers that failed to achieve this. Readers with the persistence to finish will learn a great deal. The story begins with a 1994 agreement between America, its allies and North Korea. In exchange for the North Koreans dismantling a plutonium reactor (purportedly being built for electricity) under international inspection, the allies would build two proliferation-resistant light water reactors and ship fuel oil to the country to tide it over. Taking office in 2001, President Bush denounced that agreement as a bribe that rewarded bad behavior. “We don’t negotiate with evil; we defeat it,” added his vice-president. Hurling insults in return, Kim resumed North Korea’s nuclear program; 2006 saw both a missile and a bomb test. Pritchard supports his argument with extensive quotes from communiqués, speeches and diplomatic exchanges plus detailed explanations of the subtleties of Asian diplomacy and much less subtle views of Bush hard-liners. The author is too diplomatic to express strong feelings, but even readers tempted to skim will detect his depression because he tells a depressing story. (June)
