Anatomy of Victory: Why the United States Triumphed in World War II, Fought to a Stalemate in Korea, Lost in Vietnam, and Failed in Iraq

Caldwell, a defense analyst, offers up a strategic survey of America’s major wars since 1941 to determine why the U.S. was victorious in WWII but has not meet its objectives in the major wars since. According to accepted strategic theory, ends, ways, and means must be aligned to ensure victory, and, according to Caldwell, they have not been in these more recent conflicts. The book’s conclusions are somewhat obvious: WWII was largely successful because the key Allied leaders ensured that strategic ends (unconditional surrender) were clear, the means were adequate to achieve them, and the allied generals successfully fought campaigns to do so. On the other hand, he argues, in Korea the offensive north of the 38th parallel in 1950 didn’t match the desired end (stopping the North’s invasion of the South) and was not adequately resourced; in Vietnam the U.S. failed to pursue the end of creating a viable and appealing alternative to North Vietnamese communism; and in Iraq the U.S. failed in its objective by not establishing a self-sufficient democratic government. Readers well-versed in history and strategic theory may not find much that is new here, but for those who are interested in but have not read deeply on military strategy, this will be illuminating. Illus. (Nov.)