Written by a leading expert on British government (the author of Whitehall
and other books), this should become the authoritative administrative history of the postwar British premiership. Hennessy examines the 11 postwar prime ministers, from Clement Attlee to Tony Blair, to illuminate the shifting power structures within the British government. Britain has no written constitution: thus, in H.H. Asquith's famous phrase, the job of prime minister "is what its holder chooses and is able to make of it." Hennessy is especially interested in the crucial relationship between the prime minister and the cabinet. Prime ministers have historically taken either a collaborative, consultative approach with their cabinets or a noncollaborative, "presidential" approach. In relation to issues of national security, the leaders have traditionally favored a less inclusive approach. This can be dangerous, as evidenced by Anthony Eden's handling of the 1956 Suez crisis. He entered into a secret agreement with France and Israel to retake the newly nationalized canal by force, but informed neither his cabinet nor his U.S. allies about his plans. Eden's secrecy led to Britain's worst humiliation of the postwar era: Eisenhower ordered him to turn back his troops, and Eden had no choice but to comply. So strong were the lessons of Suez that even the least collaborative postwar prime minister, Margaret Thatcher, learned them well. She constantly consulted her cabinet and the U.S. during the 1982 Falklands War. Tony Blair, Hennessy asserts, has increasingly used his cabinet for purposes of media "spin control" rather than policy deliberation. For those interested in the modern British government, this is must reading. Illus. (Oct. 8)
