Five Days in \t\t August

Drawing on evidence that the atomic bomb was regarded as a weapon like \t\t any other before its first use, Princeton University's Gordin offers a concise \t\t and provocative reinterpretation of the beginning of the nuclear age. For the \t\t American military commanders in charge of the bomb, the main consideration was \t\t whether it would destroy enemy personnel and infrastructure as part of a "shock \t\t strategy" for winning Japan's unconditional surrender. Launching the nuclear \t\t missions from Tinian Island, the B-29 airplane base, further normalized the \t\t bomb's use within the matrix of Pacific island combat. Consideration of such \t\t special characteristics as radiation was muted until after the Japanese \t\t capitulation—indeed, discussions of a "Third Shot," with Tokyo the probable \t\t target, continued until the successful American occupation began in September \t\t 1945. The initially overwhelming support of the American public for the nuclear \t\t strikes reflected a belief that the war might have lasted more than another \t\t year. Even in that context, half the population opposed using gas in an \t\t attack—another indication, according to Gordin, that the atom bomb's special \t\t status was a postwar development. His worthy study concludes that the bomb's \t\t uniqueness has inappropriately encouraged Japan's reluctance to recognize and \t\t evaluate its war responsibility, and points toward the importance of examining \t\t nuclear weapons outside the familiar context of a nuclear standoff. \t\t (Feb.)